We construct a model of rational bubbles under credit frictions and show that bubbles held by banks can generate large credit expansions followed by …nancial crisis. The size of boom-bust is somewhat larger than the case in which savers directly hold bubbles. Thus massive credit exansion during booms can be interpreted as an early warning indicator of possible subsequent crisis.
Introduction
The last decade has seen the dramatic rise and fall of world-wide housing prices, culminating in the …nancial crisis and 'Great Contraction ' of 2008-2009 . This brought the …nancial system to the brink of collapse and led to unprecedented o¢ cial intervention. Currently, politicians and central bankers are busy putting the foundations of a new macro-prudential policy framework which is meant to make the …nancial system more stable and less prone to the kind of boom-bust cycle we experienced over the last …ve years. Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2008) Why did the dot-com bubble not lead to a serious banking crisis while the subprime bubble did? Should policy react to any sharp increase in asset prices or are there occasions when the market can be left safely to its own devices even when …nancial prices look to have departed from fundamentals? These are the questions we ask in our paper. Some policy makers (most notably Mishkin (2008) and Mishkin (2009) ) have argued that we should only worry about bubbles generated within the banking system. This view receives some support from the literature on 'early warning indicators of crisis' (Borio and Lowe (2002), Borio and Drehmann (2008) , Alessi and Detken (2009) as well as many others). The literature shows that an asset price boom is far more likely to result in a costly output collapse when it is accompanied by a large increase in money, credit and bank leverage. In this paper, we formalize this idea and show that who owns bubbly assets indeed matters for …nancial and economic stability.
Motivation and economic questions As
Model description In order to analyze the questions addressed above, we construct a model in which both banks and entrepreneurs are subject to credit frictions. Entrepreneurs di¤er in their productivity levels, and those with higher productivity become borrowers (and vice versa) in equilibrium. Following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) they are subject to a collateral constraint when they borrow. Following Gertler and Karadi (2009) , the amount of deposits a bank can collect depends on its net worth. When those credit frictions are severe enough, the interest rate is suppressed and bubbles can be traded once expectations are coordinated. Using this model, we compare the case in which banks hold bubbles and the case in which savers hold bubbles directly.
While not modelled explicitly, we interpret bubbles held by banks as indivisible large bubbly assets, such as commercial real estate bubbles. Since it is much larger than a typical savings of savers, individuals cannot a¤ord to buy it, but banks can do so by pooling savings of individuals. Bubbles held by individual savers can be interpreted, for example, bubbles attached to equities. Those are divisible and savers can buy them.
Results The emergence of all bubbles leads to massive expansion of credit and bank leverage, consistent with the empirical evidence. When bank-held bubbles burst, banks become insolvent and need to be rescued by the government. The fall in their net worth causes a severe credit crunch and output collapse. In contrast, the e¤ects of asset price busts on real activity are milder when savers directly hold bubbles. The intuition behind the result is simple.
When savers hold bubbles it is those savers who su¤er from capital loss. Borrowers and banks do not su¤er directly. In contrast, when banks hold bubbles, bursting of bubbles directly hit the banks net worth and they often become insolvent. In order to avoid insolvency we assume that the government bails out the banks. However, even with this policy, a severe deterioration of bank net worth results in credit crunch, resulting in sharp decrease in investment and output.
Overall, our …ndings are consistent with the informal argument that bubbles are dangerous when they are held by leveraged …nancial intermediaries.
We also provide a theoretical justi…cation and explanation for the usefulness of money, credit and bank leverage in predicting future crises. Nevertheless, we also show that within our model it would be di¢ cult for a policy-maker to tell with con…dence whether a bubble will result in a …nancial crisis or not.
Literature review Motivated by the recent global economic stagnation following the subprime crisis of the US, there is growing literature on models of economic ‡uctuations that emphasize the role of credits. Much literature incor-porates various forms of credit frictions and how those frictions amplify the effects of technology and/or …nancial shocks Moore (2009), Christiano et al. (2010) , Karadi (2009), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) ).
The literature …nds the importance of credit shocks (shocks to net worth of borrowers or banks) but it is not easy to identify what they are in reality. An example of shocks that change the value of …rms and bank net worth used in the literature is a shock that makes …rms capital obsolete Karadi (2009), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) ). However, it is not very obvious how such shocks indeed occured during every boom-bust cycles. Instead, following Martin and Ventura (2010) , our explanation of the crisis is based on changes in investor expectations rather than changes in technology and/or …nancial shocks. Collapse of bubbles in our model serves as credit shocks.
Our paper contributes to the recent growing literature on rational bubbles under credit frictions, pioneered by Ventura (2010) and subsequent work includes Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006) , Kocherlakota (2008) , Arce and Lopez-Salido (2008) , Martin and Ventura (2010) , Farhi and Tirole (2010) , Hirano and Yanagawa (2010) . Ever since the seminal work of Tirole (1985) , the 'rational bubbles'literature has been very interested in the question of whether bubbles are expansionary for aggregate economic activity or not. The traditional view was that bubbles replace excessive investment and therefore have a contractionary impact on total output. Subsequent papers have shown that when there are credit market imperfections, bubbles may have an expansionary e¤ect through a variety of mechanisms that determine entrepreneurs'current net worth and access to leverage.
In Martin and Ventura (2010) the expansionary e¤ect of bubbles arises because the anticipated pro…ts from future bubble sales are collateralisable and allow entrepreneurs to increase borrowing in the current period. As a re-sult more production to be undertaken by the most productive entrepreneurs, thereby increasing aggregate TFP. In Farhi and Tirole (2010) bubbles increase interest rates and actually reduce the leverage available to borrowing entrepreneurs through what Farhi and Tirole (2010) call the 'competition e¤ect '. This is negative for investment. However there is a positive 'liquidity e¤ect '. When entrepreneurs need a means of saving in between investment opportunities, the increase in interest rates makes them richer when the investment opportunity …nally comes.
Our model contains some of the channels discussed in the literature as well as some novel ones. We have a 'liquidity e¤ect 'because bubbles enhance the rate of return of those saving in anticipation of future investment opportunities.
We also have a 'competition e¤ect 'though it is somewhat less prominent than in Farhi and Tirole (2010) because bubbles simultaneously increase interest rates and reduce production costs (real wages in our case).
The new channels we introduce arise due to the presence of credit constrained …nancial intermediaries in our model. This o¤ers several alternative and complementary mechanisms through which bubbles generate lending and output booms. In our model, limited …nancial market participation is key because it allows banks to borrow at the deposit rate in order to issue loans (or buy bubbles) whose rate of return is higher than the deposit rate. Following
Gertler and Karadi (2009) the net present value of such spreads (the franchise value of banks) is collateralisable and therefore changes in the spread increase banks'ability to collect deposits. During a bubbly episode, the net worth of borrowing entrepreneurs rises as they sell bubbles, increasing loan demand and pushing up loan-deposit spreads.As a result, the value of the bank (including the franchise value of future spreads) increases, leading to a rapid expansion of deposits. Thus, lending to entrepreneurs increases even in the case in which bubbles compete with 'real loans 'in banks 'portfolios. This channel is similar in spirit to the collateralisability of pro…ts from future bubbles sales discussed in Martin and Ventura (2010) but the mechanism is di¤erent because it relies on the expansion of bank rather than corporate balance sheets. Our approach is complementary to theirs and, we believe, particularly useful for analysing …nancial stability issues.
Plan of the paper Section 2 introduces the economic environment, section 3 describes the bubble-free equilibrium and discusses the conditions for the existence of bubbles. Section 4 describes the bubbly equilibrium and uses a calibrated version of the model to discuss the e¤ect of bubbles 'emergence and collapse on …nancial stability. Finally, section 5 concludes.
The Model
The economy is populated with three kinds of agents. There are continuum of in…nitely lived entrepreneurs and a continuum of in…nitely lived workers both of measure 1. There is also a continuum of bankers who have …nite lives and can die with probability 1 in any period, conditional on being alive in the previous period.
Entrepreneurs
Each entrepreneur is endowed with a constant returns to scale production function which converts labor h t into output in the next period y t+1 .
where a i t is a productivity parameter which is known at time t.
In each period some …rms are productive (a period with probability ; and an unproductive entrepreneur in this period may become productive with probability n . This probability is independent across entrepreneurs and over time. This Markov process implies that the fraction of productive entrepreneurs is stationary over time and equal to n=(1 + n), given that the economy starts with such population distribution. We assume that the probability of the productivity shifts is not too large:
This assumption implies that the productivity of each agent is persistent.
Entrepreneurs are ex-ante identical and have log utility over consumption streams
Entrepreneurs purchase consumption (c t ), bubbles (m t ) at price t and bonds b t . They also pay wage bills w t h t in order to receive future revenues a i h t . Here w t and h t denote real wage and labor respectively.
where R i t is the interest rate which is equal to the loan rate R l t when the entrepreneur is a borrower and R d t when the household is a saver.
Due to limited commitment in the credit market, agents will only honour their promises if it is in their interests to do so. We assume that only a fraction of the value of the …rm can be seized by creditors. Hence the collateral constraint is given by:
They maximize (3) subject to (4) and (5).
Workers
Unlike the entrepreneurs, the workers do not have production technology nor any collateralizable asset in order to borrow. They maximize the following utility
subject to her ‡ow-of-funds constraint
here superscript 'w' stands for 'workers'. In equilibrium, it is shown that workers do not save because the equilibrium interest rate is low. Therefore they consume their labor income in each period.
Banks
We assume that savers cannot directly lend to borrowers and that lending is done by banks. Bankers are risk neutral and live for a stochastic length of time. Once bankers receive an "end of life" shock, they liquidate all their asset holdings and consume all of them before exiting. This shock hits with probability 1 :
Banks maximize the following objective function:
subject to a number of constraints explained below.
In each period the bank has net worth (n t ). It collects deposits (d t ) from the savers. Then it lends to the borrowers (l t ), purchases bubbles ( t ), or consumes (c b t ). Therefore its balance sheet is given by
The evolution of net worth is given by
Following Gertler and Karadi (2009), we model banks subject to limited commitment. More speci…cally, the banker may divert 1 fraction of deposits.
Once he diverts, he will close his bank and the savers can retain the remaining fraction of deposits. Since the savers recognize the banker's incentive to divert funds, they will restrict the amount of deposit. Those assumptions imply the following borrowing constraint
The left hand side of equation (11) is the value when the banker diverts, while the right hand side is the value when he did not (i.e., the continuation value of the bank). We also assume that the bank cannot short m t . The bank maximizes (8) subject to (9), (10) and (11).
Equilibrium without bubbles
Before characterizing an equilibrium with bubbles it is informative to characterize the equilibrium without bubbles. In this section we set t = 0 at all times.
Optimal behavior
The entrepreneur has a few choices of accumulating net worth. Let R t (a t ) be the maximum rate of return on the net worth from time t to t + 1 for the entrepreneur with productivity a t = a h ; a L : Then it is given by
The …rst term in the right hand side is the deposit rate. The second term is the rate of return of bubbles. The third term is the rate of return on production without borrowing. The last term is the rate of return on production with maximum borrowing. By borrowing from banks secured by fraction of output, the entrepreneur can …nance externally a t =R l t amount (equation (5)).
Therefore the denominator is the required downpayment for the unit labor cost. The numerator is the output after repaying debt.
Note that the last two rates of return in equation (12) are strictly higher for the productive entrepreneur than the unproductive entrepreneur, and the deposit rate and the rate of return of bubbles are the same for both. Therefore in equilibrium the unproductive entrepreneurs supply deposits and produce if and only if their rate of return of production is equal to the deposit rate. We focus our analysis on such case, namely 1 ,
Intuitively, the borrowing constraints are tight enough so that the productive entrepreneurs cannot absorb all national saving. Then there is not enough demand for deposits. In such case the savers use both bank deposits and its own production technology to accumulate wealth.
The productive entrepreneurs borrow and produce, and their rate of return is given by (5) and (4) their employment is given by
Regarding the workers, their labor supply h s t is given by
They will not save and consume all their labor income when
Later we will verify this is true in the neighborhood of the steady state equilibrium.
Finally, let us characterize the bank. When R 
Here t can be interpreted as the bank's leverage. Then, with equation (11) binding, deposit is given by
By substituting (21) and (22) into (8), t satis…es 2 Need to show the conditions under which this is true.
Note that the above formulas show that t increases when t+1 increases.
This implies that the current leverage depends on the future franchise value of the bank which is re ‡ected by the leverage next period. 3 It also shows that t is an increasing function of the spread R l t
3.2 Aggregation and market clearing 
When (13) holds, the unproductive entrepreneurs are indi¤erent between making deposits and producing, thus their aggregate saving is split as follows
where D t denotes aggregate deposit.
Let us turn to banks. Under the banks binding borrowing constraint, the aggregate deposit is given by
Notice that 1 fraction of banks exits in each period by liquidating all their net worth. Therefore the aggregate net worth of the operating banks is given by N t :The aggregate balance sheet of the operating banks is given by
Let us turn on the transition of state variables. Note that the unproductive entrepreneurs become productive in the next period with probability n and the productive entrepreneurs continues to be productive with probability 1 .
Their rates of return are given by (14) and (13). Therefore net worth of the productive entrepreneurs evolves from (14), (15) and (17) as
Similarly, the aggregate net worth of the unproductive entrepreneurs evolves
From aggregating production function, aggregate output is given by
Finally, aggregate bank net worth is given by
The markets for goods, labor, capital, loan and deposit must clear. Goods market clearing implies that aggregate saving must equal to aggregate invest-ment.
From (19), labour market clearing implies clears the goods, labor, capital, loan and deposit markets and (iii) the equilibrium evolution of state
is consistent with the individual choices of entrepreneurs, banks and workers and with the exogenous evolution of productive opportunities at the individual …rm level.
In equilibrium, equations (13), (23)- (33) jointly determine 12 variables
Since the analytical solution is complicated and not very informative,
we discuss the properties of the steady state based on numerical simulations.
The parameter values we use are in line with Aoki, Benigno and Kiyotaki (2009) and are discussed in more detail in Appendix X.
Existence of steady state bubbles
It is useful to characterize the deposit rate R 4 Similarly to Farhi and Tirole (2010) , whether a bubbly steady state exists and who owns bubbles depend on whether the two interest rates are lower than the growth rate (which we assume is equal to 1) in the 'no bubbles' steady state.
In our economy, the severity of credit frictions is represented by two parameters, and : Figure 2a shows the region of and in which the deposit rate is less than one and low productivity agents produce in equilibrium (the red area). In this case, the savers (unproductive entrepreneurs) have incentive to buy bubbles in order to boost the rate of return they receive on their savings. The blue parts of the graph show parts of the parameter space where the economy is very credit constrained. At such low values of and low productivity entrepreneurs are active but wages are so low that even such ine¢ cient projects deliver a rate of return greater than unity. As a result, savers have no incentive to hold bubbles in such economies. The white parts of the graph (very high values of and ) shows parts of the parameter space where low productivity entrepreneurs do not produce because the …nancial system is well developed. Here again, the rate of return on deposits is greater than unity and savers have no incentive to hold bubbles. So it should be clear from Figure   2b that the conditions for the existence of bubbles is satis…ed at intermediate levels of …nancial development. The red area of Figure 2b shows the region in which the loan rate is less than one. Then the banks have an incentive to buy bubbles. Since the deposit rate is always lower than the loan rate, the savers also have incentive to hold bubbles at these parameter values. It is natural that the part of the parameter space where banks bubbles can exist is more limited compared to the parts of the parameter space where saver bubbles exist. Because banks'borrowing constraints bind, this introduces a positive spread between lending and deposit rates. Hence the parameter space where bank bubbles exist is subset of the space where savers have an incentive to invest in bubbly assets. If both the loan and deposit rate are lower than one, we consider two cases. Firstly, we allow only banks to hold bubbles. In other words we assume limited participation. Even though not modelled explicitly, what we have in mind is the situation in which bubbles are attached to large indivisible assets such as commercial real estate. In such a case, individual savers cannot a¤ord to buy bubbles because their savings are too small. However, the banks could buy bubbles by pooling savings from individual savers. Thus the pooling of small depositors' savings is one of the fundamental functions of …nancial intermediaries in our model. Another story we could tell is that bubbles are sometimes attached to assets which are not easy for individual savers to trade, due to transaction costs for example. Again, only banks will hold bubbles in such an environment.
Secondly, we allow both banks and savers to buy bubbles. This corresponds to a situation in which bubbles are attached to more divisible and standardized assets, such as equities. Then individual savers can a¤ord to buy the bubble.
It turns out that in such a steady state, only savers hold bubbles while banks stay out. This is because savers' opportunity cost of holding bubbles is the deposit rate while the bank's opportunity cost is the loan rate which is higher than the deposit rate. In the steady state equilibrium we consider, the rate of return of bubbles is equal to the deposit rate, so the savers crowd out banks from bubbly asset markets.
Equilibrium with bubbles

Calibration
We have 8 parameters
; a H =a L ; ; n; ; ; ; we need to calibrate before we proceed to examine the quantitative predictions of our model economy.
There is little consensus regarding , the Frisch elasticity of labour supply.
Micro-data evidence suggests a value close to zero based on the labour supply behaviour of primary earners. The real business cycles literature usually sets a much higher value in the region of 3 or even higher. The di¤erences is justi…ed by the presence of labour market frictions that ensure that aggregate labour is highly elastic even though individuals are relatively unwilling to vary their market hours over time. Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) make this argument and set the Frisch elasticity to 10 in their model. We pick a value of = 5, which is within the range set in calibrating macro models. a H =a L is an important parameter, whose value is also highly uncertain. As studies such as Bernard et al. (2003) and Syverson (2004) We calibrate the remaining 6 parameters in order to match the steady state predictions of the model in the absence of bubbles to 7 moments in the US data. These are (1) the real loan rate minus the growth rate of real GDP;
(2) the real deposit rate minus the growth rate of real GDP; (3) commercial bank leverage; (4) average corporate leverage; (5) average leverage for highly leveraged corporates; (6) the rate of return on bank equity and (7) the ratio of M2 to GDP. Full details of data sources and construction are available in Appendix A. Bank rate of return on equity (R
) 1.150 1.154
Competitive equilibrium with bubbles
When the banks hold bubbles, this must imply that they are indi¤erent between bubbles and loans
otherwise, either bubbles do not circulate or lending becomes zero. 5 When (34) holds, the banks value function t is still given by equation (23) Without loss of generality, we normalize the aggregate supply of bubbles equal to one. Then the aggregate value of bubble is equal to t . The balance sheet of banks (equation (27)) is now given by
Since a part of national savings is invested in bubbles, the goods market clearing (saving = investment) is modi…ed as
The other equilibrium conditions remain the same as Section 3.
Next, let us discuss the initial period when bubbles show up. We assume that the productive entrepreneurs will create bubbles. Suppose that bubbles 0 show up at time t = 0. This is pure gain for the productive entrepreneurs.
Therefore their net worth equation (28) is given by
They sell bubbles to …nance employment. Now equations (13), (23)- (26), (28) is consistent with the individual choices of entrepreneurs, banks and workers and with the exogenous evolution of productive opportunities at the individual …rm level.
As many other models of rational bubbles, our economy has many kinds of bubbly equilibria depending on agents'expectations. Our strategy is to look at a bubbly equilibrium that can at least qualitatively explain boom-burst cycles we observed in reality. Much literature on economic ‡uctuations search shocks such as productivity and credit shocks that can realistically explain data once those shocks are put into DSGE models. Conceptually we are doing a similar exercise but instead of fundamental shocks we are searching for expectational shocks (such as investor sentiments).
Bubbles and …nancial stability
In this section we characterize the dynamics of the economy in which bubbles circulate. One of the key questions of our paper is how the impact of asset price bubbles on …nancial stability depends on who holds the bubble. So in the next subsections we examine the e¤ects of the emergence and bursting of di¤erent bubbles. In all experiments we assume that the currently productive agents are endowed with intrinsically useless 'zero dividend 'assets. We assume that the model is initially in a steady state in which investor sentiment regarding the future resaleability of these assets is pessimistic and so they have zero market
value. In addition, we assume that investor sentiment suddently changes and the 'bubble 'asset starts to trade at a positive value. In our …rst experiment (described in Figures 3a and 3b above) , we consider a situation in which investor sentiment shifts in favour of indivisible assets that can only be purchased by banks that pool the savings of many di¤erent small savers. Investor sentiment remains positive for ten periods and then turns negative again. At this point the bubble collapses. All the above events occur in a wholly unexpected (one time shock) fashion.
The emergence and bursting of a bank-intermediated bubble
When the bubble …rst appears, productive entrepreneurs become very rich because they create and sell bubbles. This represents a pure wealth gain, and, because collateral constraints continue to bind under small enough bubbles, productive agents leverage up their increased net worth to raise borrowing and employment. Initially, banks'net worth is limited and this restricts the amount of loans they can supply while also purchasing bubbles from productive entrepreneurs. Therefore, the lending rate increases sharply, and, in order to compete with the loan rate, the bubble grows rapidly over time. For one period, banks make a huge pro…t due to the increased spread between the loan rate and deposit rate. In turn, this rise in current and expected future profitability increases the franchise value of the bank (represented by t ), relaxes the bank's collateral constraint and leads to a sharp increase in leverage. So the appearance of the bubble and the associated sharp rise in bank pro…tability and leverage allows banks to raise a lot more deposits and …nance an increase in both lending and bubble holdings. Despite the fact that the bubble has to compete with loans in banks portfolios, its appearance leads to a 'crowding in ' e¤ect, which increases lending and investment in two ways. One is through the increase in investor net worth, leading to higher corporate borrowing capacity.
The second is through the increase in the franchise value of the banks, leading to higher loan supply.
In subsequent periods, higher bank pro…ts increase bank capital and allow for a rapid expansion of lending as the loan rate and bank leverage go down.
As the productive entrepreneurs expand their employment, the employment of the unproductive entrepreneurs is crowded out. This improves the aggregate e¢ ciency of the economy and TFP increases. As a result, output expands.
Thus, similar to Ventura (2010) and Martin and Ventura (2010) , bubbles are expansionary in our model. After ten periods in a 'bubbly equilibrium'we assume that investor sentiment suddenly and unexpectedly turns and the bubble collapses to zero. When the bubble bursts, the banks that own it experience a massive decline in their net worth. In our model the loss is so large that the banks become insolvent in the absence of government intervention. In order to prevent this we assume that the government gives them a bail out which it …nances by raising lump sum taxes from all entrepreneurs in the model. In the interests of realism, we assume that the bail out is not large enough to maintain bank net worth. As a result, bank capital falls sharply and this leads to a credit crunch characterised by a spike in lending-deposit spreads and in bank leverage. High-productivity entrepreneurs 'employment decreases sharply due to the credit crunch. Since the entrepreneurs do not hold bubbles their net worth is not directly a¤ected by the collapse of bubbles. So the decrease in employment and output is driven entirely by the credit crunch.
Bubbles and TFP shocks
A number of papers, starting with Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) have shown that when credit frictions prevent the most productive …rms from purchasing all factors of production, the economy may experience endogenous credit cycles that look very similar to conventional technology shocks. This happens because, as the net worth and borrowing capacity of high productivity agents increases, they increase their productive activities at the expense of low productivity agents. This resource re-allocation improves aggregate e¢ ciency and leads to an increase in output. More recently, Ventura (2010) and Martin and Ventura (2010) have applied this argument in the case of bubbles in economies with credit frictions. They show that the emergence of bubbles can lead to a large realocation of resources towards more productive use, increasing economy-wide TFP. Conversely, the collapse of bubbles can shift resources into less productive …rms, leading to a reduction in aggregate e¢ ciency.
This e¢ ciency-enhancing e¤ect makes it harder to spot bubbles reliably because, in terms of their output e¤ects, they look like conventional TFP shocks.
So in this subsection, we compare the e¤ects of a boom-bust cycle driven by The …rst thing to note is the remarkable similarity between the evolution of output and TFP during the boom phase under both experiments. But whereas the end of a TFP boom only returns aggregate technology to a around its starting level, the e¤ects of the bursting of a bank-held bubble on aggregate TFP are more dramatic. As we argued above, this additional output volatility is largely due to the credit crunch that occurs following the collapse of the bubble.
Moving on to …nancial variables we see that their evolution is very di¤erent under the two scenarios. Bank leverage, bank pro…tability and the size of bank balance sheets relative to GDP increase much more sharply during a bubbly episode compared to a standard aggregate technology shock. When the bust comes, its e¤ects on …nancial variables are dramatic in the case on the bubble but very limited in the case of ordinary TFP shock. When a bank-held bubble bursts, it wipes out the net worth of the banking system and the ratio of bank net worth to GDP falls very sharply. Bank balance sheets contract sharply and the ratios of money and credit to GDP fall substantially. Credit, in particular, undergoes a sharp decline because higher loan rates reduce credit demand.
Bank leverage rises sharply on the back of improved bank pro…t margins. After a crisis period in which loan rates reach very high levels and deposit rates fall sharply, bank net worth recovers some way towards pre-crisis levels and the credit crunch begins to abate. To clarify the evolution of …nancial variables under an ordinary TFP shock, we plot them by themselves in the Figure 5 below. Qualitatively, the series are somewhat similar to the ones that occur under a bank-held bubble. The improvement in aggregate technology generates an increased demand for liquidity from both investing and saving entrepreneurs. Because bank capital is pre-determined in the initial period of the shock, the higher liquidity demand leads to an increase in bank pro…ts and a rise in the franchise value of the bank (which includes the NPV of future bank pro…ts). The higher franchise value relaxes the bank's collateral constraint and allows it to expand leverage, loans and deposits. When the improvement in productivity reverses after 10 periods, the same process operates in reverse. Bank pro…ts fall and bank balance sheets contract driven by lower demand for liquidity by entrepreneurs.
The boom-bust cycle follows a familiar and intuitive pattern. But it is a very mild cycle that hardly leads to ‡uctuations in money and credit aggregates or in banks 'leverage and net worth, either during the boom or the bust phase of the cycle. In the previous subsection we examined the behaviour of the economy under a bubble which is only held by the banking system. The emergence of such a bubble is initially very good for banks because it provides them with unique access to an alternative store of value, raising their pro…ts and net worth in the process. But many real world bubbles do not fall under such a 'limited participation' description. For example equity bubbles can be held by any investor, no matter how small. This raises an important question. How much should we worry about such 'equity 'as opposed to 'credit 'bubbles?
In this subsection we experiment with the emergence and bursting of a 'divisible 'bubble, which can be directly held by low productivity savers. We show that banks may or may not join in the bubble depending on their profitability. In what follows we compare the e¤ects of a 'bank-held'bubble with the e¤ects of a 'saver-held'bubble. Under the bank-held bubble, the bust leads to a big fall in the net worth of banks and a credit crunch that sharply reduces output and TFP. A bubble that is only held by unleveraged savers has none of these undesirable consequences for …nancial stability. The di¤erences between the evolution of …nancial variables allow us to gain a better understanding into why the real e¤ects of the two types of bubbles are so di¤erent. During the bubble, bank balance sheets expand more dramatically when banks are directly involved (leverage and money to GDP ratios all increase substantially). Loans to the 'real'sector grow faster under the saver held case because they do not have to compete with bubbles on banks' balance sheets. But total bank assets (bubbles as well as 'real 'loans) grow more rapidly under the bank-held bubble. Bank pro…tability is extremely strong under both scenarios underpinned by strong loan demand from entrepreneurs with sharply higher net worth due to the pro…ts from their recent bubble sales. This, as well as higher leverage, is why banks' net worth increases by more when banks hold the bubbles.
Just like in the previous section, here we burst the bubble after 10 periods in order to examine its e¤ects on the economy. The ratios of loans and money to GDP decline gradually when savers hold bubbles. The fall is much sharper when banks intermediate the bubble. The credit crunch leads a sharp increase in the price of credit. Hence the economy experiences another surge in bank leverage and bank pro…t margins. This helps bank capital recover after a period of restricted bank credit and money supply.
When do banks buy ' saver bubbles'?
In the previous subsection, we noted that 'saver bubbles 'tend to have more benign e¤ects on …nancial stability compared to 'bank bubbles'. The reason for this lies in the behaviour of banks who choose not to purchase 'saver bubbles' even though they have the opportunity to do so. 'Saver bubbles 'earn the the same rate of return as deposits which is lower than the loan rate as long as the borrowing constraint on the banks is binding. So banks choose rationally not to buy them, instead focusing on their traditional (and much more pro…table) activity -loans to entrepreneurs. In the previous subsection, when bubbles appeared, high productivity entrepreneurs ' net worth rose sharply as they sold bubbles to low productivity entrepreneurs. This allowed them to increase their demand for credit as they leveraged up their increased disposable wealth.
The resulting increase in credit demand pushed up bank pro…t margins, making sure that banks did not buy the bubble due to its inferior rate of return. When the bust came, bank net worth was insulated from the collapse of the bubble. This is why our 'saver bubble 'scenario did not feature a credit crunch and a fall in TFP.
In this subsection we ask whether such a benign scenario will always be the case? In our baseline case banks chose not to become exposed to the 'tech bubble', leaving unleveraged investors to reap its 'ups ' and 'downs '.
Here we construct a scenario in which banks may choose to invest in a bubble even without the limited participation assumption and describe the conditions under which such a scenario might obtain.
The experiment we conduct is the following. In the …rst period of the simulation the economy experiences positive investor sentiment and this leads to the emergence of an investor bubble. Then two periods into the bubble, the economy experiences a '…nancial liberalisation' which we proxy by a reduction in the share of deposits that the bank can abscond with in the event of bankruptcy. Two periods later, the 'saver bubble 'bursts and the the share of deposits that can be stolen by the bank returns to its initial value. While the bubble continues, such a 'reshu-ing'of the portfolios of banks and savers has no consequences for prices and real allocations. Therefore, the share of the bubble held by banks is indeterminate up until the point where banks' balance sheet constraint starts to bind. In the above simulation, we have assumed that banks expand their balance sheets to buy bubbles as much as they can. Therefore, this experiment represents an upper bound on the risks to …nancial stability from 'saver bubbles '.
Model-implied ' early warning signals'of crisis
In the last ten years, there has been a big increase in the number of researchers who have sought to learn about the empirical regularities in banking and more general …nancial crises. Now, following the 2008-09 …nancial crisis, the interest of policy-makers in developing empirical measures that can help in predicting the occurence of future banking crises is greater than ever. Most of the existing studies naturally utilise a largely atheoretic approach, focusing on …nding robust crisis predictors without necessarily spelling out the underlying mechanism by which such predictors are related to the eventual occurence of …nancial crisis. Our paper can provide some theoretical backing and interpretation behind some of these 'early warning signals 'of …nancial instability.
Rapid growth in money, credit and bank leverage is likely to be associated with a bubble
Even though the evolution of output is similar between bubbles and standard positive TFP shocks, the evolution of …nancial variables is very di¤erent. In particular, bank balance sheets (money, credit relative to GDP as well as bank leverage) expand much more rapidly under bubbles than under TFP shocks.
This provides a justi…cation for the threshold approach used by Borio and Lowe (2002) , Alessi and Detken (2009) and others in identifying boom-bust episodes. In our model, big increases in money, credit and bank leverage to GDP are likely to have their origins in bubbles and hence signal increased likelihood of future crisis.
Distinguishing between ' costly 'and ' harmless 'bubbles ' ex ante'is hard in the model
Bubbles on assets that can only be held by banks ('bank bubbles ') are more likely to have damaging consequences for …nancial stability compared to bubbles that can be held by other economic agents ('saver bubbles'). This is because banks will often choose not to invest in 'saver bubbles 'and will therefore remain una¤ected by their bursting. But as we saw in section xx this is not always the case. When banks'pro…ts from traditional business loans are low, they can be tempted to join in a 'saver bubble'. Can a policy-maker who cannot tell bubbles from real loans notice whether the banking system is engaged in a dangerous bubble or not just by looking at bank balance sheets?
Our analysis showed that the same size bubble caused a sharper balance sheet expansion under a 'bank bubble'. But the di¤erence is not as large as between bubbles and positive TFP shocks. So our policy maker would be able to tell that there is an unsustainable asset price boom somewhere in the economy but would not be sure whether the collapse of the bubble would lead to bank failures. This provides a reason why the literature on 'early warning signals ' has struggled to …nd really robust measures that can forecast crises with a high degree of con…dence. For example Alessi and Detken (2009) and Kannan et al. (2009) both …nd that even their best early warning indicator is still subject to large Type I and Type II errors. In our model this is an unavoidable consequences of the fact that the di¤erent types of bubble we examine do not have hugely di¤erent implications for aggregate variables during the boom phase. Table 3 provides a summary of the main conclusions of our analysis.
Summary
7 For the e¤ects of bank competition on bank riskiness see (Boyd and De Nicolo (2009) ). The literature identi…es two o¤setting channels. First of all, more bank competition implies a lower franchise value of the bank leading to more risk taking. But there is a second e¤ect working in the opposite direction. More bank competition will lead to lower loan rates and this may reduce the riskiness of the bank's loan portfolio, making the bank safer overall.
Our model introduces some new channels linking banking sector competition with bank riskiness that have not hitherto been explored in the literature.
For us, more competition reduces pro…ts from traditional lending and may tempt banks into investing in bubble assets. This increases the risk that the bubble may burst and reduce bank net worth. But there is an o¤setting e¤ect. More bank competition, reduces the value of the …rm and, in the Gertler and Karadi (2009) framework, this leads to lower leverage. As a result, experiencing the same loan loss would have a smaller impact on bank capital. 
Conclusions
In this paper we do four main things (i) We examine the conditions for the existence of bubbles in a framework that incorporates a non-trivial role for …nancial intermediaries
(ii) We show that the presence of banks enhances the the liquidity e¤ects of bubbles because the presence of bubbles enhances bank excess returns which are collateralisable. We show that bubbles are therefore more likely to be expansionary in a model that models banks explicitly.
(iii) We …nd that …nancial stability is most at risk when bubbles held by banks collapse. In contrast, if unleveraged savers hold bubbles, the bubble's collapse has relatively few consequences for …nancial intermediation and for the solvency of the banking system.
(iv) The model provides a rich array of theoretical predictions regarding the impact of di¤erent types of bubbles on real and …nancial variables. These can be useful in interpreting the results of the growing literature on 'early warning indicators' of …nancial crises. In particular we …nd that large bank balance sheet expansions signal the presence of a bubble in the economy. However, it is more di¢ cult within our model to be sure whether the bubble is held by banks or by ordinary savers. 'Bank bubbles'lead to bigger movements in bank balance sheets but the di¤erence is not large enough to be used as a robust indicator.
46 the model. This is given in Table A1 below: 
